Co., 7 P.2d 919 Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. The appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana was heard at the same time as an appeal in another cause involving a like question, and the two were decided together, though with separate opinions. The revision of the tariff was followed by this suit against the carrier, and later by a judgment for the shipper which is now before us for review. In doing so, it ruled, in conformity with the decision in the Doney case, that the published schedule prescribed the minimum and the maximum to which carrier and shipper were required to adhere while the schedule was in force, but that, by the true construction of the statute, the duty of adherence was subject to a condition or proviso whereby annulment or modification would give a right of reparation for the excess or the deficiency. It filed a complaint with the board to the effect that the existing tariff for the carriage of crude petroleum distillate was excessive and unreasonable, in that the rate of 20 1/2 cents was based upon an estimated weight of 7.4 pounds per gallon, whereas the actual weight is not more than 6.6 pounds per gallon. The procedure there outlined was followed by this respondent. It coupled that decision with the statement that, upon compliance with one or other of the conditions, the excess, thus ascertained, might be the subject of recovery. The court held that, until one of these preliminary conditions had been satisfied, no action for restitution could be maintained against the carrier. He did it without a preliminary suit in which the board, being brought into court as a defendant, would have opportunity to sustain the schedule and resist the change. He did this without a preliminary application to the board to modify the schedule. A shipper of lumber brought suit against a carrier to recover transportation charges which were alleged to be unreasonable, though they were in accordance U. The meaning of the statute was considered by the Supreme Court of Montana in a cause determined in May, 1921. Until changed or set aside, they "shall prima facie be deemed to be just, reasonable, and proper." § 3810.
In an action against the board, they may be set aside upon a like showing by a judgment of the court. They may be changed by the board itself, on the complaint either of shipper or of carrier, if found to be unreasonable. The rates thereby established are not beyond recall. A writ of certiorari brings the case here.īy a statute of Montana, the Board of Railroad Commissioners is empowered to fix rates of carriage for intrastate shipments. The question, broadly stated, is whether the annulment by retroaction of rates valid when exacted is an unlawful taking of property within the Fourteenth Amendment. In this action to recover the excess so paid, the shipper recovered a judgment which was affirmed upon appeal. After payment had been made, the same commission which had approved the schedule held, upon a complaint by the shipper, that the rates so approved were excessive and unreasonable. The charges were in conformity with a tariff schedule approved by the Railroad Commission of Montana for intrastate traffic. Sunburst Oil & Refining Company, the respondent, brought suit against petitioner, Great Northern Railway Company, to recover payments claimed to be overcharges for freight. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.
358 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA SyllabusĬertiorari to review the affirmance of a judgment against the railway company in a suit for overcharges.
366.Ĭertiorari to review the affirmance of a judgment against the railway company in a suit for overcharges. A federal claim first raised by petition for rehearing in a state court is in time, for purposes of review, if the occasion for it arose unexpectedly from the grounds of the state court's decision. It is for the state courts to decide whether changes in their views of the common or statutory law shall apply to intermediate transactions.
If a statute as construed by the state court does not impair a party's federal right, a decision applying the construction to him on the ground of stare decisis but rejecting it for future cases cannot do so. The result is the same whether the tentative character of the rate, and the right of recovery, are expressed in the words of the statute or were attached to it by a construction of the state supreme court before the parties contracted. Where the state law prescribes freight rates through a Board but allows a shipper who has paid at a rate so fixed an action for overcharges when the Board, afterwards, on his complaint and on sufficient evidence, finds such rate excessive and lowers it for the future, judgment for the shipper does not impair any federal right of the railroad, since the law, making the rate thus tentative, was the basis of the contract of shipment.
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